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Origins and Development of SWIFT, 1973–2009 
 
Susan V. Scott

 and Markos Zachariadis

 
 
 
 
Research in this article traces the origins of a not-for-profit financial institution called the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (S.W.I.F.T.). SWIFT is a 
core part of the financial services infrastructure and widely regarded as the most secure 
trusted third party network in the world serving 200 countries with over 8000 users. Our 
analysis focuses on how the design and current state of SWIFT was influenced by its 
historical origins. In order to ensure widespread compatibility in a sector experiencing 
asynchronous technological development, legacy Telex specifications had to be 
accommodated in SWIFT’s design. Over time, what began as a closed “society” founded to 
reduce errors and increase efficiency in inter-bank payments grew into an industry co-
operative supporting an enthusiastic community of practice and transformed into an 
unexpected network phenomenon. SWIFT achieved such success that it has been accused of 
being an installed base stifling innovation. In recent years, SWIFT has had to institute new 
categories of membership in an effort to counter concerns about its bank dominated 
governance and it continues to search for ways to meet the requirements of key constituents 
in the financial supply chain. 
 
Keywords: SWIFT; financial services; diffusion of innovations; networks; standards; payment 
systems; electronic funds transfer; ICT in banking 
 
 
Introduction 
It is widely presumed that there is a close relationship between globalization, financial 
institutions and financial markets however relatively little is known about the 
infrastructure that supports this interaction. Business historians have called for more 
research to investigate the creation of a ‘second global economy’ (Jones, 2007) 
reminding us that the organization of global business phenomenon are ‘heavily 
contingent on time, industry, the state of technology, home economy and public 
policy, as well as the specific competences and routines of each firm (Jones, 2005). 
The aim of this research is to understand how the design and current state of SWIFT 
was influenced by its historical origins. Before we begin to analyse the development 
of SWIFT, it might be helpful to briefly explain what SWIFT is and why it is core to 
financial services infrastructure. SWIFT’s primary role is that of a message carrier. 
More specifically: 
 
[The] object of the company is for the collective benefits of the members of the company and 
their affiliates and branches, the study, creation, utilization and operation of the means 
necessary for the telecommunication, transmission, and routing of international private 
proprietary financial messages between the members of the company.
1
 
 
It is important to emphasise that SWIFT is not a bank or a clearing and settlement 
institution; it does not manage accounts on behalf of customers nor does it hold funds. 
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Although it is involved in the organization and distribution of data, it does so on a 
‘store-and-forward’ basis and does not maintain financial information on an on-going 
basis instead, ‘[a]s a data carrier, SWIFT transports messages between two financial 
institutions’ (‘About SWIFT’, 2009). SWIFT is responsible for providing the 
platform, products, and services that allow member institutions to connect and 
exchange financial information. If one asks contemporary financial service 
professionals, they will say that the most critical part of SWIFT’s role is achieving the 
secure exchange of proprietary data: reliability, confidentiality and integrity. 
Thoughtful practitioners will describe the SWIFT infrastructure as a key-operating 
asset while others regard it simply as necessary but fundamentally uninteresting 
sector-wide ‘plumbing’. Its current status belies a more compelling account of 
institutionalization that charts SWIFT’s evolution from an efficiency initiative driven 
by a closed ‘society’ of banks to a network innovation of world-class standing.  
 As McKenney et al. (1995) note, ‘few firms have broken the mold of history 
and transformed their industries with a new dominant design for information 
processing’. A historical analysis of SWIFT is justified from this perspective alone. 
However, as this special issue shows, not-for-profit organizations that have had a 
transformative influence on their sector provide additional pause for thought. The 
story of SWIFT is one of international co-operation as much as competition between 
institutions which provides a nuanced rejoinder to the claim that changing 
infrastructure is ‘akin to engaging in guerrilla warfare, in which the competent, 
effectively led group wins’ (McKenney et al., 1995). Dominance can also be achieved 
by committee: designing the rules that govern a core infrastructure and setting 
standards. However, this depends upon sector-wide adoption and diffusion which 
eludes the majority of initiatives who may aspire to a similar status. SWIFT achieved 
its current taken-for-granted dominance with an intercalated design, in other words a 
pre-existing technological heritage was folded into the new SWIFT network. The 
starting point for appreciating the development of SWIFT is, therefore, to understand 
its relationship to Telex. 
 
Understanding the origins of SWIFT: Telegraphy, cable technology and Telex 
The use and impact of telecommunications and network innovations in banking can 
be traced back to the late 1840s when the recently developed electrical telegraph 
enabled faster inter-market communications and reduced differences in securities 
prices between remote stock exchanges in the United States (Garbade and Silber, 
1978). Since then, further advances in telegraphy and cable technology gave rise to 
domestic point-to-point networks transmitting signals represented by alphanumeric 
characters. By the end of the century, national networks had become global, thus 
linking all continents and enabling information flows in almost every major financial 
centre of the world. Batiz-Lazo and Wood (2002, pp. 193-4) categorise this era as the 
‘early adoption period’ when individual banks began to carry out international 
transactions with correspondent banks. Similar use of the telegraph also enhanced 
communications between head offices and branches constituting the in-house bank 
network. Additional evidence in Garbade and Silber (1978) suggest that early 
innovations such as the introduction of the first trans-Atlantic submarine cable in 
1866 also facilitated greater integration of securities trading between New York and 
London.
2
 
Further improvements in message routing and switched-network technology, 
as well as the extensive use of the typewriter keyboard, laid the foundations for the 
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first teleprinter exchange (or Telex) networks.
3
 Automatic dial subscriber-to-
subscriber services were first introduced in Germany before the second World War 
using a switching system from Siemens and Halske.
4
 Soon after, the United Kingdom, 
France, US, and Canada followed (Carré, 1993). The Telex which operated as a 
privileged teleprinter network for the benefit of various industries, including the 
banking sector, was initially based on the use of the existing telephone and telegraph 
networks and allowed speech and teleprinter signals on the same connection 
(Beauchamp, 2008). The service promptly supplanted the telegram for business 
subscribers (Hills, 2007) and by 1957 it connected 19 European and 18 Latin-
American, African and trans-Pacific countries with the US and Canada, giving access 
to more than 30,000 separate subscribers over international communications.
5
 The 
participant base grew fast and it is estimated that in the late 1970s there were more 
than one million users worldwide.
6
 One of the most compelling features of the Telex 
was its capacity for internationalization and it soon became apparent that the 
compatibility between Telex networks would be a significant issue to assure the 
feasibility of global message transmissions. Early in the process (June 1964), the 
International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (C.C.I.T.T.) proposed 
a mutually agreed way forward to manage the increasingly composite technical 
standards that paved the way for ‘the advent of worldwide automatic telephony and 
Telex.’ 7 
 Although banks, stock exchanges and other financial institutions were the first 
and most numerous users of the Telex, there was a notable increase in subscribers 
from other industries towards the end of the 1960s. During the same period many 
large US and European banks established private networks and invested in computer 
installations to process and manage electronic data (Batiz-Lazo and Wood, 2002). 
Banks were focused on decreasing costs through automation and increasing 
transactional efficiency with other financial institutions. Domestic electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) systems emerged, (for example BACS
8
 in the UK and CHIPS
9
 in the 
US) to eliminate paper from the payments process. As international markets 
expanded, a number of Trans-National Banks (TNBs) began to compete in foreign 
markets pushing the boundaries of international operations ever forward (Crane and 
Hayes, 1983; Davidson, 1982). Their rapid growth meant that the majority of 
international banking was in the hands of relatively few banks. Langdale (1985, pp. 3) 
notes that during in the late 1970s, 67% of all foreign US lending business was 
conducted by 12 Trans-National Banks. 
 As large multinational banks turned their attention to establishing global 
operations and developing international business, their requirements for reliable 
computerised communication systems increased. This expansion was mainly driven 
by a strategic move from clearing banks to meet the requirements of their clients 
abroad as their distribution channels, suppliers, and customers were reaching to 
distant economies (Holland, 1995; Holland, Lockett, and Blackman, 1992). Such 
cooperation between multinational firms and Trans-national banks led to the 
development of a number of electronic data interchange (EDI) systems that would 
integrate financial processes offered by banking operations in order to manage 
payments (Holland, Lockett, Richard, and Blackman, 1994). At the forefront of such 
strategic expansions were banks such as Citibank N.A., Bank of America, and Chase 
Manhattan in the US, and Barclays, Lloyds, and Midland Bank in Europe. The 
employment of public networks was rejected mainly because their volume-driven 
rates were regarded as a potential constraint on future growth in banking activity.
10
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These major banks therefore found themselves in the role of pioneers 
developing proprietary private networks using circuits and satellite facilities leased 
from PTT (Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph) authorities.
11
 The key design criteria for 
these elaborate international private-data arrangements was the need for reliable, 
secure transmissions and the accommodation of distinctive (sometimes unique) in-
house standards developed for international financial transactions. Leading this wave 
of innovation in financial telecommunication technologies was Citibank’s IT centre in 
New York which had developed a proprietary messaging standard known as MARTI 
(Machine Readable Telegraphic Input). The banking community balked at Citibank’s 
attempt to impose their proprietary standard on international payments and competing 
standards emerged. As frustration with duplicated effort built up and an inter-
organizational impasse emerged, key players began to recognise that they needed to 
negotiate a compromise and agree upon a common messaging language if they hoped 
to realise efficient international transactions. 
From Telex to the Society for Worldwide Inter-bank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT) 
One of the most important challenges facing financial institutions in the design of a 
common messaging system capable of increasing volumes of international payments 
was the reduction of their operational risk (e.g. the reduction of error rates, increase of 
security, and greater reliability). In the existing system, a cross-boarder transaction 
would often require the exchange of more than ten Telex messages, which made the 
process costly and time consuming. Authentication procedures
12
 needed to ensure the 
necessary level of security for fund transfers were also complex and increased labour 
intensity. To make things even more complicated, Telex messages were being 
transmitted in the form of free text allowing the users to send payment instructions in 
various formats. In the words of a former Vice President of Citigroup and ex-SWIFT 
board member: 
 
[It] was literally in English [free text] and then some guy had to interpret that and put all the 
account numbers on, the debit account, the credit account, and the typists would come along 
and type out forms…people realized if we’re using this form as an input device with all the 
instructions and information coming in…if we got the messaging in the right structure you 
could cut out all these people. 50% of all transactions…was one community…if you took 
[the largest international] 20 banks, 60% of their interaction was with each other anyway. So 
if you put them together you don’t have to have a big community to get efficiency, and it was 
really about how do we get these computers to create efficiency. 
Suddenly they realised that the aim of MARTI was correct but it had to be a 
community issue, where they all got the same benefit. Because the only time you would get 
the benefit was when the biggest banks would do it together, cause they all had the same 
technology, therefore, what you need to change wasn’t that different per bank.13 
 
The idea of a common standard and creation of an industry cooperative 
capable of addressing the problems inherent in the existing Telex technology had been 
widely discussed since the beginning of the 1960s. However, it was evident that such 
an initiative could only be feasible if there was close cooperation among the banking 
community (U.S. Congress, 1984). Throughout the history of banking, the boundary 
between competition and cooperation has had to be navigated; in the case of SWIFT, 
support for a shared network slowly gained momentum and began to achieve 
institutional form. 
The earliest available evidence for this is in the late 1960s, when the Société 
Financière Européenne (SFE)
14
, a consortium of six major banks based in Luxemburg 
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and Paris, initiated a ‘message-switching project’15. By 1971, there was sufficient 
interest to generate sponsorship from 68 banks in 11 countries within Western Europe 
and North America (‘SWIFT Plans to Start May 9: New SWIFT network gives banks 
an instantaneous link worldwide’, 1977) for two feasibility studies to examine ‘the 
possibility of setting up a private international communications network’16. These 
studies were conducted by two consultants: Logica in Great Britain who were made 
responsible for the technical and financial side, and the Stanford Research Institute 
(SRI) in the US, who analyzed the legal and organisational aspects
17
. Based upon the 
findings of these studies, completed in 1972
18
, the banks continued with the project 
and user groups were set up in each country to coordinate views and comments from 
the member banks (BGA, SWIFT presentation, p. 2, June 1975). In addition to this, 
international working parties were assembled to work on standards relating to 
messaging formats, security, and network technology. As expected, disagreements 
between banks and attempts by countries to impose their own standards were 
commonplace at this stage; nevertheless, discussions moved forward and on May 3 
1973, the Society for Worldwide Inter-bank Financial Telecommunication 
(S.W.I.F.T.) was founded as a co-operative non-profit organisation. SWIFT was 
headquartered in Brussels (a diplomatic alternative to the intense rivalry between New 
York and London) and permanent staff were appointed. At the time of its founding, 
SWIFT
19
 membership amounted to a total of 239 banks from 15 countries. By the end 
of 1974 an initial design of the long-awaited network was complete and after an 
exhaustive selection process the Burroughs Corporation from Detroit, U.S.A., was 
selected to supply the computer equipment and install the system
20
. 
 
[Figure 1. about here] 
  
 Despite the challenges faced by SWIFT and its users in the early stages of its 
development, this phase is characterized by those involved as one of optimism in 
which members on both sides of the Atlantic showed considerable willingness to 
engage in the cooperative effort needed to ensure that the system ran smoothly. The 
technical network design gradually began to stabilize
21
 and traffic started to increase 
rapidly as more countries went ‘live’. By February 19 1979, the volume of messages 
passing through the SWIFT network exceeded 120,000 per day
22
. As the quest for 
new network solutions and communication technologies was taking place, SWIFT 
was already delivering benefits to its members beyond its core attributes. Among the 
early advantages that SWIFT members enjoyed were speed of messaging, lower costs, 
increased volumes, more secure transactions, and standardization. Table 1 provides a 
description of the benefits and advantages of SWIFT membership.  
 
[Table 1. about here] 
 
What is remarkable about the early history of SWIFT is that a “society” 
founded by a relatively small number of banks to reduce errors and increase 
efficiency in inter-bank payments, evolved into a broader industry co-operative and 
became an unexpected network phenomenon. The notion of a network effect was not 
part of the consciousness of those involved in the original SWIFT project during the 
1970s. Their focus was solely on creating an entity, a closed society, to bind members 
together in an organizational form that would enforce standards designed to create 
efficiencies on transactions between the member banks.  
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Standards and regulation 
In parallel to establishing their primary infrastructure, another significant issue for the 
future growth of SWIFT was the development (and adoption) of standard message 
formats. Prior to SWIFT, banks used paper forms or templates for cheques and 
transfer orders. These templates could be considered as a first attempt to standardise 
financial data by ensuring that users provided the required information in a generally 
established configuration. However, because free (unformatted) text messages could 
be sent via Telex a commonly agreed format had not been developed for international 
wire transfers. Part of the remit of the SWIFT design team was to ensure widespread 
compatibility which meant encompassing past practices and legacy technologies 
rather than innovating.  
 
[At] that time, since the Telex was one of the major tools for electronic communication, the 
new SWIFT language was heavily influenced by it. Much effort was spent to ensure 
compatibility between existing Telex information flows and the new SWIFT electronic 
information flows. This meant that the printed version of a SWIFT message looked very 
similar as its corresponding Telex version.
23
 
 
 Ensuring that SWIFT could accommodate existing manual practices and 
become part of automated back office projects in banks around the world was critical 
at this juncture. Telex compatibility meant that banks could produce the same 
outgoing message and then allow the communication application or SID to determine 
whether it should be sent via Telex or the SWIFT network depending on the intended 
destination. This was of major significance especially in the beginning where only a 
few banks had adopted SWIFT and needed to transmit messages to other banks that 
were using older technology. Information flow was organised accordingly into 
“message types” and “fields”.24 In the ‘Telex world’, each financial institution was 
described by its Bank Identifier Code (BIC) and this was simply incorporated into the 
evolution of the new system of work as “the SWIFT code”.25 All the registered 
SWIFT addresses were listed in the SWIFT directory. Figure 2 illustrates how a 
payment instruction can be translated to a SWIFT message. 
 
[Figure 2. about here] 
 
 While it is interesting to consider how the design of SWIFT accommodated 
the historic Telex legacy
26
, it is also important to appreciate its influence on the future 
momentum of techno-innovation in the sector. For example, there is evidence that 
banks began to extend their use of SWIFT standards to operations in business areas 
beyond international payments.
27
 As a former banker recalls: 
 
[Our bank] had its own standard…then we suddenly realised, why do we have to have our 
own internal standard? If you’re using one standard externally why don’t we use that same 
standard internally?...We basically took the SWIFT message and put our internal wrap 
around it and used SWIFT standard internally from that point and on. We suddenly realised 
it’s not only good for dealing with everyone else. 28 
 
Once banks realised the efficiencies created, interest in standards began to 
gain momentum in other pockets of financial services, the most significant of which 
was securities. The securities industry proactively organised itself under ISO 
(International Organization for Standardization), namely in a subcommittee (SC4 – 
Securities and related financial instruments) of the technical committee TC68 
(Banking, securities and other related services)
29
. During this period, the 
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ISO/TC68/SC4 working group designed a series of message types under the ISO 
standard ISO 7775. This standard, which was based on the SWIFT language, 
contained about 50 message types that were implemented in subsequent stages on the 
SWIFT network between 1984 and 1997
30
. The SWIFT organization was mandated 
by ISO to assume management control and preserve the existing message set on 
behalf of the community.
 
A historical perspective draws attention to the way in which the role of 
SWIFT has changed in relation to challenges facing the financial services community 
at specific points in time. The origins of SWIFT lie in finding a solution to the 
immediate problems occupying banks in the late 1960s: market access; transactional 
efficiency; operational risk; robustness and security
31
. Having been instituted to 
establish a jointly-owned global messaging communications network and achieved 
critical mass, a path-dependency with standards development is realised. As a 
consequence, SWIFT gradually assumes responsibility for a core self-regulated 
financial infrastructure and the development of standards needed to maximize benefits 
from it. SWIFT currently describes its combined organizational mission as follows: 
 
[SWIFT is]…a member-owned cooperative through which the financial world conducts its 
business operations with speed, certainty and confidence… Our role is [to]… act as the 
catalyst that brings the financial community together to work collaboratively to shape market 
practice, define standards and consider solutions to issues of mutual interest....SWIFT 
enables its customers to automate and standardise financial transactions, thereby lowering 
costs, reducing operational risk and eliminating inefficiencies from their operations’32 
 
SWIFT’s history has been characterized by negotiation and compromise 
between stakeholders from the start - by definition, its role as a third party places it in 
relation to on-going tensions. To understand how these relationships have been 
worked out in practice, it is necessary to study the changing governance arrangements 
at SWIFT and in particular how they have maintained the precarious dual role of 
network provider and standards development. 
 
SWIFT by-laws and governance 
The distinctive nature of SWIFT’s governance is reflected in its ownership structure. 
Being an industry co-operative, SWIFT is solely owned by its member banks. Its 
capital structure was initially based on a mixture of equity and loan. On the equity 
side, each new member from the existing countries was allocated shares depending on 
their traffic volume. For new countries, members would only be given one share until 
cutover to operational status. After that they would also receive shares according to 
their usage of the network. Each share, apart from implying ownership rights, was 
also an obligation to grant SWIFT a loan (maximum $1,000 per share with an annual 
interest rate fixed by the Board of Directors) which enabled the cooperative to cover 
the costs of its international network operations during its development phase
33
. Once 
this initial capital base was established, SWIFT membership required payment of an 
entrance fee to cover operational costs. This was $3,200 for all members that joined 
before the 30 September 1972 and $5,000 afterwards. In 1982, SWIFT was able to 
completely repay the development costs of its network and break even. This ‘cost-
recovery’ system along with the annual tariffs and messaging fees reflected the non-
profit status of an organization whose ultimate objective was the collective benefit of 
its members. 
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 The Society, which was created under Belgian law and registered in Brussels, 
is controlled by its Board of Directors. These are elected annually at the General 
Assembly by the member banks. In the early years, SWIFT was administered by the 
“General Manager” who supervised all the departments responsible for the daily 
operations of the organization: Operations, Administration and Engineering, Finance, 
and Services and Security
34
. However, a larger management structure has been put in 
place and the SWIFT Board of Directors currently delegates the day-to-day 
management of the Company to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The CEO chairs 
an Executive Committee formed by the CEO, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), the 
Chief Information Officer (CIO), the Head of Marketing, the Heads of the three 
Regions and the Head of Stakeholder Relations. 
 The choice for the location of SWIFT’s headquarters was fundamentally 
influenced by the studies conducted by Logica and the legal sub-committee of the 
Message Switching Project (MSP) steering committee (assisted by SRI Europe). 
Initial recommendations also included Amsterdam as a potential candidate but 
Brussels prevailed due to its stable ‘social climate’ and its regulatory, legal, and fiscal 
advantages. In parallel, other legal forms were considered for the entity of the 
company. At first the legal committee opted for the formula of an International 
Association as it was less costly than the Cooperative. Eventually, after considering 
the nature of SWIFT’s operations in the commercial field and the obvious charitable 
character of International Associations, the decision was made in favour of the 
Cooperative Society. This was also partially due to the severe legal profit restrictions 
on the International Associations versus a more flexible regulation for the 
Cooperatives. In the next section, we examine the evolution of SWIFT’s strategy in 
this distinctive context. 
Objectives and strategy outline 
Analysis of archive documents reveals that shortly after SWIFT commenced 
operations in 1977, the management team drew up a detailed report (which they refer 
to as the “Company Plan”) on objectives, strategies, and the factors affecting the 
development of the cooperative. As an industry cooperative, SWIFT’s primary goal 
was to serve its members in ‘the best possible way’: 
 
[Our] objectives should be defined in function of the service we wish to offer to our member 
banks. [First objective of SWIFT could be stated as] to offer member banks access to the 
largest number of national and international financial systems and networks through one 
interface.
35
  
 
To understand this objective we need to remind ourselves of the original 
concept of SWIFT as a message carrier. Unlike other EFTs like CHIPS or BACS, 
SWIFT is only a channel for the transmission of financial messages. This means that 
once the financial instructions are communicated, the banks (and not SWIFT), are 
responsible for settling the transaction via a clearinghouse (Kozolchyk, 1992)
36
. 
SWIFT’s standing as a trusted core financial services infrastructure rests not on the 
transfer of actual assets but on the value that the financial community places on secure 
connectivity. This is why the management team made it their priority to offer access 
to international financial systems by approaching national clearing systems, foreign-
exchange (FX) dealing systems, and Eurobond settlement centers. In this way, SWIFT 
could play a key role in controlling service tarrifs
37
, realizing end-to-end process 
efficiencies rather than just reducing transaction costs. As further parts of the financial 
services infrastructure evolved a number of connectivity events (for example, 
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CREST
38
 and CLS
39
) prompted more organizations to join SWIFT and thus increased 
the company’s ‘network effect’ still further. Indeed, SWIFT is so effectively 
institutionalized into the core global financial services infrastructure that their defacto 
status has raised concerns. 
Membership growth and network access 
Concerns about the balance of power within SWIFT’s governance have been ever-
present. As a European initiative designed to thwart the potential dominance of 
proprietary bank standards (see previous discussion of Citibank’s attempt to force 
MARTI on counterparties), SWIFT’s membership was originally dominated by 
European banks which meant that despite the international nature of the markets for 
which they were competing there were inevitable geo-politics. Langdale (1985) notes 
that that one of SWIFT’s initial concerns was ‘the competitive advantage held by 
large U.S. TNBs because of their sophisticated leased networks’ (p. 6). For this 
reason, SWIFT was often perceived as a means of competing with these large intra-
bank systems (U.S. Congress, 1984).  
Over time, it became apparent that direct competition with U.S. banks was not 
going to be the most defining feature influencing the design and development of 
SWIFT. The interest of US banks in SWIFT was tempered by the existence of their 
own federal systems such as FEDWIRE (owned and operated by the Federal Reserve 
Banks) and BANKWIRE (a private initiative) which met domestic demand for 
message transfers. Nevertheless, the deficiencies of the Telex technology for 
international payments meant that major US banks were keen for SWIFT to be in 
operation. US banks were among the first to adopt SWIFT and they proved highly 
effective in realising its benefits (Scott, Van Reenen, and Zachariadis, 2008). 
While geo-politics were the cause of occasional thematic interest, the more 
enduring source of tension for SWIFT’s governance has been managing the boundary 
between co-operation and competition among stakeholders with different strategic 
identities. This need for arbitration between multiple interests within the financial 
community has patterned the development of SWIFT from its inception to present 
day. Managing the boundaries of ‘co-opetition’ (Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1993) 
in the financial community has proved crucial to the establishment of core not-for-
profit infrastructure. 
A source of controversy in this regard has been whether or not to extend 
SWIFT membership beyond banks. Accepting new types of members onto the 
network had been debated throughout the history of SWIFT (‘SWIFT busters strike 
out’, 1992). In 1987, SWIFT's member banks voted to expand the user base by 
including broker dealers, exchanges, central depositories and clearing institutions. 
SWIFT initially started its operations in the securities sector via a collaboration with 
CEDEL – a leading bank-owned securities and depository system in bond clearing. 
Additional cooperation agreements were drawn up with settlement system, Euroclear. 
Finally, SWIFT itself added a new message type suitable for direct securities 
transactions between banks (‘Future directions for SWIFT’ 1983). All these moves 
have been regarded as important ways to inject more value-added services into 
SWIFT to accommodate the emergence of new financial products. 
Other financial institutions however did not find SWIFT so ready to extend 
membership. The efforts of international fund managers to become members of the 
Society were blocked by vote. After years of frustration they were accepted in 1992. 
This time it was the US banks that were ‘swimming against the tide’ amid fears of 
losing business as fund managers were going for other payment solutions (‘SWIFT 
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busters strike out’, 1992).40 In Europe there were fears concerning how fund managers 
would be defined and ‘what status they will have in the system’ (‘SWIFT lets in fund 
managers’, 1992). By the end of 1992, the membership of SWIFT had risen to 3,500 
members (see Table 2). 
 
 [Table 2. about here] 
 
Further complaints about the banks’ exclusive hold over the governance of 
SWIFT were raised in the 1990s by triple A-rated corporations who expressed an 
interest in becoming SWIFT members on the grounds that they wanted to influence 
the priority given to standards innovation. They argued that SWIFT’s ownership of 
both network and standards led to over-emphasis on the interest of financial services 
companies at the expense of innovations that would benefit corporate treasuries. 
Around 1998, SWIFT acknowledged that they needed to make some changes in their 
governance and later created a special category (MA-CUG) of membership in order to 
accommodate corporate interests. The Member Administered – Closed User Group 
allowed corporations to access the SWIFT network through member banks only.  
By 2009, the SWIFT user base consists of almost 8,500 members that access 
the network everyday to carry out financial transactions. It is calculated that every 
year more than 3.5 billion messages (ranging from traditional payments to securities 
confirmations across the network). SWIFT’s status as a core financial services 
infrastructure and its standing in the community as the most trusted secure network 
has placed an additional pressure on both its governance and design. In addition to 
demands for contingency planning and robustness that all major financial institutions 
have had to face since 9/11, SWIFT acknowledge that the next stage of their 
development has to be considered in relation to the advance of open standards and the 
emergence of phenomena such as cloud computing.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Understanding the origins and development of SWIFT highlights distinctive features 
of innovation in the sector as well as focusing attention on a number of important 
tensions characterising key relationships involved in establishing a not-for-profit 
financial institution responsible for critical inter-organizational financial services. The 
main emphasis in many accounts of information systems in business history has been 
on the development from ‘people as computers’ (i.e. clerks) to computer-based 
devices and techniques, primarily: the automation of document preparation (word-
processing), information storage, and data manipulation such as financial analysis and 
accounting (see Campbell-Kelly and Aspray, 2004). Our study of SWIFT not only 
adds to the relatively few studies of core financial infrastructure
41
 but also draws 
attention to a different kind of information systems innovation: a not-for-profit 
institution designed for collective benefit to study, create, utilize and operate the 
necessary means for the telecommunication, transmission, and routing of international 
private proprietary financial messages.  
Robert Winder (1985) attributes SWIFT’s uniqueness to the fact that it was a 
jointly owned cooperative at a time when ‘the ambitious banks were already spraying 
computing power across the world in an attempt to establish a market advantage’ (p. 
55). This illustrates the contradictory tensions at the heart of SWIFT: it was suggested 
that SWIFT would be in immediate competition with existing financial institutions 
(U.S. Congress, 1984), however it found a way to leverage ‘co-opetition’ (Nalebuff 
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and Brandenburger, 1993) and SWIFT currently promotes its operations on the basis 
of a productive complementarity.
42
 Perhaps the most significant difference between 
other not-for-profit initiatives that became part of the global infrastructure, such as 
VISA (see Stearn, 2011), and SWIFT is that organizations have a choice regarding 
their use of the former whereas the latter is a de facto sector technology standard. 
SWIFT has become what Callon (1986) terms an “obligatory passage point” (i.e. if 
you want to do business with us you must join because there is no real alternative) for 
financial organizations around the world and the network expanded rapidly. SWIFT’s 
standing as a trusted third party has grown over time and later adoptees have signed 
up for the reputational kudos of membership as well as the benefits generated by the 
‘network effect’ created by widespread adoption. These benefits both surpass the 
initial goal of transaction efficiency and reinforce the value of connectivity.  
The productive complementarity that many not-for-profit institutions aspire to 
has taken the form of a significant ‘community of practice’ (Lave and Wenger, 1991) 
around SWIFT. As banks extended their connectivity and straight-through-processing 
projects
43
, SWIFT accumulated a wealth of best practice documentation which was 
made available to members. Research participants describe how regional SWIFT user 
groups provided useful brainstorming opportunities where technology and operations 
professionals could join forces to problem-solve. The international banking 
community may not have trusted each other, but they all trusted SWIFT. Over time, 
SWIFT has become the ‘forum for the financial community’ (‘History of SWIFT’, 
2009). SIBOS, SWIFT’s International Business Operations Seminar has played a key 
role in this regard. It has developed into an important annual conference for the 
banking community where concerns and issues can be aired (see Table 3 where these 
are reflected in themed debates at SIBOS) 
 
[Table 3. about here] 
 
One final distinguishing characteristic of SWIFT is the diffusion of its 
standards internally and externally throughout financial services. It is notable that, as 
with the insurance sector (Yates, 2005), incremental change was preferred to radical 
transformation. As discussed above, once the underlying network had been 
established, the most important issue for the future development of SWIFT was the 
development (and adoption) of standard message formats. Just as paper-based form 
templates were used as the basis for Telex transmissions, the Telex message format 
was then used as the basis for SWIFT messages which were subsequently used for 
internal as well as external process innovation. Exploring the standardization of 
technology
44
 in a related financial services context, Yates (2005) finds evidence to 
support the notion that past use of a technology shapes the adoption and use of a new 
technology. Furthermore, she suggests that standards hold significance in the 
structuring of organizations because as they become inscribed into routines and 
practices they have the potential to shape contexts in particular ways. From this 
perspective, the institutionalization of SWIFT at the core of financial services 
infrastructure could arguably be described as dominance by ‘design’ through 
everyday governance of both network and standards.  
What is missing from the story of SWIFT? The launch of SWIFT brought to 
light an absence of common legal principles for international transactions (general 
case law). The original SWIFT guidelines were inadequate to deal with the multi-
jurisdictional nature of international transactions. The complicated and technical 
mechanics of international fund transfers required the development of new case law 
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clearly describing the responsibilities and liabilities of participants using the network. 
After a series of disputes concerning loss of interest losses as a consequence of delays 
from payments via the SWIFT network, in February 1979, the member institutions 
adopted new SWIFT-specific rules that addressed four particular issues: 1) the choice 
of forum and applicable law, 2) the standard of care and liability, 3) the amount of 
recovery, and 4) the duration and timing of payments (Ambrosia, 1980). However, as 
the 2008 credit crunch illustrated, the regulatory guidelines governing multi-
jurisdiction disputes about financial transactions are still far from firmly established. 
SWIFT’s history therefore has to be placed in the context of on-going technological 
developments, an emergent international regulatory landscape, the economic fate of 
financial services organizations and the limits of ‘co-opetition’.  
Although SWIFT was a significant innovation at its initiation, some have 
asked if its hold over both network and standards development has created barriers for 
further change. The issue of whether it is meeting the requirements of all the 
constituents throughout the financial supply chain has been widely debated (Dialogue 
2005). In recent years, major corporations have felt the need to petition SWIFT for 
more recognition in its membership and governance. SWIFT has attempted to address 
this issue by developing some special categories of membership but steadfastly 
maintains that the majority of organizations must remain ‘Users’. However, SWIFT 
management shows continued willingness to consult with other standards 
organizations and has formed working groups such as “Innotribe” at SIBOS in an 
effort to counter these claims. This illustrates the constant pressure placed on the 
SWIFT organization to meet expectations and offer new products or services to 
address these on-going concerns in which governance and technological innovation 
are inextricably linked. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Organisation Bylaws for Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT), July 14 1972 provided by SRI (Stanford Research Institute), SRI Report accession 
No. L050042). 
2 Garbade and Silber (1978) uncover statistically significant evidence illustrating that the 
introduction of three innovations in communications technology: domestic telegraph, the 
trans-Atlantic cable, and the consolidated ticker tape led to the significant (in the first two 
cases) narrowing of inter-market price differences. 
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3 For a detailed review of the technological advances that led to the development of the Telex 
see Carré (1993). 
4 Siemens and Halske (now Siemens A.G.) also provided the equipment for the early Telex 
network installations in the US and Canada. One of the early commercial models was the 
Siemens T 100 Page Teleprinter. For more technical information on the installations see 
Easterlin (1959, 1962). 
5 Retrieved December 2009, from Colombo (1958).  
6 This estimate was retrieved in December 2009, from Introduction to Data Communications 
for "Post-Modern" SMEs. CORDIS archive, from 
http://cordis.europa.eu/infowin/acts/ienm/products/ti/chap1.htm. Additional estimations for 
later dates can be found at Jeppesen and Poulsen (1994).  
7 The International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (C.C.I.T.T.), Blue 
Books, Third Plenary Assembly (Geneva: May 25 to June 26, 1964). Among the 
Recommendations of the 3rd plenary assembly was E.29, the international telephone 
numbering plan that defined the country and area codes.  
8 Banker’s Automated Clearing Services (BACS) is a ‘not-for-profit, membership based, 
industry body’ which is responsible for the clearing and settlement of automated payments in 
the UK. BACS which is own by 15 of the leading UK and European banks and building 
societies, started its operations in 1968. For more information see: www.bacs.co.uk 
9 The Clearing House Inter-bank Payments System (CHIPS) is a privately (member)-owned 
clearing house in the US that mainly serves the needs of large financial institutions operating 
in the United States and dealing in US dollars. CHIPS stared its operations in April 1970 with 
9 participants and in 2010 serves 48 banks. Both BACS in the UK and CHIPS in the US are 
bank-to-bank electronic transfers. For more information see: www.chips.org.  
10 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Banks and International 
Communications—Background Paper, OTA-BP-TCT-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern. 
Printing Office, September 1992).  
11 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Effects of Information Technology on 
Financial Services Systems (Washington, D.C.: OTA-CIT-202, September 1984).  
12 Telex authentication procedures between corresponding banks were quite complex and 
time consuming. A former installations engineer who is now a Senior Manager in Securities 
Market Infrastructures at SWIFT opined: “[On] a Telex machine you had two sets of tables, 
like logarithmic tables…then the Telex sender would basically perform some calculations 
based on the valued A currency and amount, and then bringing these tables and work out the 
keys and come up with a tested Telex result…for every single Telex that was sent had to 
manually calculate what this Telex test key was…So you can imagine, not only were there 
hundreds if not thousands of these messages being sent every day from some of these banks, 
the chances of human error, of getting the result wrong or when it was received at the other 
end, if it was from one small bank to another small bank, this would be a manual process to 
transmit and it would also be a manual process to receive. So when you received the tested 
Telex you then have to do the reverse calculation to make sure that the Telex hadn't been 
tampered with during transmit and receive cycles. So it was incredibly labour intensive, it was 
incredibly prone to human error… imagine the costs.” (Interview, 31st March 2009, London). 
13 Interview, 13 November 2008, London.  
14 Incorporated in April 1967, Société Financière Européenne (SFE) was a conglomerate of 
six major banks: Algemene Bank Nederland, Banca Nazional del Lavoro, Bank of America, 
Banque National de Paris, Barclays Bank Ltd., and Dresdner Bank (Ross, 2002). It was 
initially founded to finance investments in Europe that was rapidly growing at that time. The 
SFE, ‘a typical consortium bank’, had operational and legal independence and largely 
reflected the strategy of its shareholders towards the European competition. For more 
information on this subject see Ross, 2002. In CBI 90, Tray 21, Video No. M36, it is claimed 
that the driving force behind the idea which goes back to 1969, was the first Board Chairman 
of SWIFT, Johannes Kraa. 
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15 Guildhall Library Manuscripts (GLM) Section, M32326B, File No. 253, British Bankers 
Association (BBA), Private and Confidential Communication, February 27, 1979. 
16 Barclays Group Archives (BGA), 80-4134. A talk delivered at the Computer Conference 
of Barclays Banks International, June 1975. 
17 Charles Babbage Institute holdings (CBI), Burroughs Corp. records (CBI 90), Videotapes 
and films, Tray 21, Video No. M36, SWIFT presentation given by Charles Rodeshaw in 
opening speech at the 3rd Annual International Banking Operations Seminar (SIBOS) held 
Sept. 1980 in Copenhagen, Denmark and attended by over 1000 bankers from 37 countries. 
Also additional information were obtained from “Organisation By-Laws for Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)”, July 14, 1972 provided by 
SRI (Stanford Research Institute), SRI Report accession No. L050042. 
18 According to private communication between the BBA and the SWIFT [UK] Ltd., Logica 
delivered its final report at SWIFT on the 4
th
 of February 1972, GLM, M32326B, File No. 
253, BBA, 13
th
 March, 1978. 
19 We have checked the naming convention with the Society and they have confirmed that 
they have shifted from using the acronym S.W.I.F.T. to the word 'SWIFT'. After defining the 
full name of the Society and noting the acronym, we therefore conform to the Society's 
preference for 'SWIFT'. 
20 According to (CBI), Burroughs Corp. (Ascent ion 90), Press Releases 1947-1987 (90:72, 
Box 1, Folder 17, 7
th
 of March, 1974), the initial value of the equipment was more than 6 
million USD, and included two dual central processor B 3700 computer systems, four data 
communications processors, and 14 data concentrators. 
21 Our discussion of the early stages of SWIFT network design and technology development 
has been edited but can be found in Scott and Zachariadis (2010) and Zachariadis (2011). 
This includes technical details about: the switching centres; data concentrators; network 
interface issues; the SWIFT Interface Device known as SID, ST100, ST 200; the founding of 
SWIFT Terminal Services S.A. (STS); and the emergence of a supporting software market. 
We also discuss the development trajectory from central switches to distributed networks and 
packet switching. 
22 Guildhall Library Manuscripts (GLM) Section, M32326B, File No. 253, British Bankers 
Association (BBA), Private and Confidential Communication, February 23
rd
, 1979. Up to 
then SWIFT had a theoretical capacity of 200,000 messages per day however, there were 
concerns regarding its capability to deal with the transactions’ load in the near future. 
23 Unpublished document on SWIFT standards, Brussels, circa Jan., 2001. 
24 Each “Message Type” (MT) was codified using a three-digit number. The most common 
message type was MT100, which was an instruction for a customer fund transfers. Other 
commonly used messages were the MT200 for bank transfers, and the MT300 for foreign 
exchange transactions. “Fields”, which had a distinct business meaning, were identified by a 
two-digit number. An additional alphanumeric character could be added in the end of the 
number to specify additional options. Not all fields were mandatory for a transaction to take 
place. 
25 The SWIFT code (or SWIFT address) consisted of 12 characters: the primary four were to 
identify the bank, the next two were identifying the country (based on the ISO standard), the 
next two were identifying the location, and the last four consisted of the terminal code (1) and 
the branch code (3). (BGA, 80-4134). 
26 For example, SWIFT messages are limited by the need to conform to the four-line thirty-
five character format institutionalised during the Telex era (interview, Head of Standards 
Initiatives, SWIFT Headquarters, Brussels, 7
th
 May 2009). 
27 Unpublished document from unknown author on SWIFT standards titled “Message 
Standards evolution in the Securities Industry: from paper-based to XML communications”, 
Brussels, circa Jan., 2001. 
28 Interview, 13 November 2008, London.  
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29 Unless otherwise stated, this paragraph borrows freely from unpublished document 
(unknown author) on SWIFT standards titled “Message Standards evolution in the Securities 
Industry: from paper-based to XML communications”, Brussels, circa Jan., 2001. 
30 These message types covered the securities areas of post-trade, pre-settlement, settlement, 
reconciliation, corporate actions and reporting. 
31 Even though SWIFT brought together a set of recent (during that time) technologies, it 
was never based on a distinct ground-breaking technological improvement. From our 
discussions with experienced bankers and SWIFT executives we were told that in some 
instances large banks with superior equipment even had to degrade their networks in order to 
be able to use SWIFT.  
32 ‘About SWIFT’, 2009. 
33 The initial financial proposition for SWIFT involved loans granted from member 
companies during the ‘development period’ (before message processing began). These were 
repaid afterwards either as credits against message transmission charges, or in cash at the 
option of the board of directors. In addition, an entrance fee was charged to all members 
joining for the first time (this was $3,200 for all members that joined before the 30
th
 of 
September 1972, and $5,000 afterwards). Information obtained from “Organisation By-Laws 
for Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (S.W.I.F.T.)”, July 14, 
1972 provided by SRI (Stanford Research Institute), SRI Report accession No. L050042. 
These loans, which were repaid with a fixed interest assigned by the board of directors, were 
later abandoned when the company started its operations in 1977. 
34 Information obtained from (GLM) Section, M32326B, File No. 253, SWIFT General 
Information booklet, circa 1979, and BGA, 80-3056-2. Services and Security seemed to be 
closer to sales, whereas, Administration and Engineering was in charge of the maintenance of 
the installed base and technical support. 
35 SWIFT “Company Plan”, BCG, 25 January 1979. 
36 Evidence suggests that, even though SWIFT messages were not implying any legal 
transfer of funds from one bank to another, they were gradually accepted by banks as 
authentic and authoritative (U.S. Congress, 1992), although this would not preclude the 
settlement of the transaction through a large EFT. 
37 Our discussion of SWIFT’s pricing negotiation with PTT and the achievement of reduced 
tariffs has been edited but can be found in Scott and Zachariadis (2010) and Zachariadis 
(2011). Achieving connectivity on SWIFT’s terms was key to the development of SWIFT’s 
strategy and linked to the cooperative nature of the society. In parallel to the negotiations with 
the local telecommunication providers, SWIFT also leveraged the ongoing technological 
developments to reduce the costs of its network operations globally. 
38 CREST Co was the central securities depository for the UK, until August 2002 where it 
was acquired by Euroclear UK and Ireland ltd. For more information see: www.euroclear.com  
39 CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement) is the ‘largest multi-currency cash settlement 
system’ founded to reduce and control the risks of foreign exchange (FX) transactions 
(www.cls-group.com) 
40 The “big” banks came to realize that they ‘can no longer push their proprietary networks 
on to investment managers as an alternative to SWIFT’ (pp.1) from ‘SWIFT lets in fund 
managers’. (1992). The Banker, 142, 1. ‘The big US banks led the opposition’, along with 
some German, French, and Japanese banks, however, their resistance is expected to be 
reversed. Information obtained from ‘Global Custody’ (1992), The Banker, 142, 795, (pp.1). 
41 See bibliography for: Frazer (1985); Kirkman (1987); Mandell (1990); Howells and Hine 
(1993); Bátiz-Lazo (2009); Bátiz-Lazo and Hacialioglu (2005); Bátiz-Lazo and Wood (2002); 
Wonglimpiyarat (2004); Stearns (2007, 2011); Panourgias (2008); and Khiaonarong and 
Liebenau (2009). For an interesting analysis of the emergence of core information services 
see Preda (2006). 
42 In the entrance of SWIFT’s headquarters in Brussels there is a digital screen that welcomes 
visitors with the message “More, Together” (observed on the 7th of May 2009). This has also 
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been part of SWIFT’s marketing campaign in 2007 and it was used as a cover for the 2006 
SWIFT Annual Report (SWIFT Annual Report, 2006). 
43 Research participants gave us examples of the programmes of change that might be 
stimulated by SWIFT adoption: automating nostro statement generation; reconciliation 
systems; routing of domestic payments; automating of dealing systems. The aim was to 
remove manual processing and intervention wherever possible to achieve ‘Straight-Through-
Processing’ (STP). In addition to internal programmes of process reengineering, there is 
evidence that connectivity events such as the adoption of SWIFT (or other core infrastructure 
such as CREST, CLS) stimulate internal process innovation and have a domino effect through 
related functional areas particularly when they reveal duplication of effort or avoidable 
operational risks.  
44 There is a substantial extant literature that examines the role of standards and 
standardization in shaping organizations, for example: Bowker and Star 1999; Hanseth and 
Monteiro 1997; Law 1992; Monteiro and Hanseth 1995; Star and Ruhleder 1996; 
Timmermans and Berg 2003. See bibliography for details. 
 
